

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Please add this memo to the package of  
NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: June.

DDI #5412-82      Date: 30 June 1982

NIO/W

Date 1 July 1982

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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

DDI 5425-82  
1 July 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: Charles E. Waterman  
National Intelligence Officer for NESA

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Meeting - June 1982

1. Almost the totality of the 17 June monthly warning meeting was utilized to consider an interagency intelligence assessment on the evolution of the Lebanon situation. The major judgments of that assessment, which attempts to judge what the likely situation will be in mid-August, are:

- The Israelis will have effectively eliminated the armed Palestinian presence in Beirut and areas under their control, and as this difficult process is completed will turn over these areas to an international force, the Lebanese central government, or to Christian militia forces. Surviving PLO armed forces will be reorganizing in Syrian-controlled or influenced areas of Lebanon.
- Although a stronger Lebanese central government will be formed, its control over the country will be fragile. Assuming no miscalculation, Syrian forces will retain control in the central and northern Biqa' area.
- The Soviets would increase their military assistance to Syria, and the increase would most likely take the form of replacing destroyed fighters and air defense equipment, sending additional advisers, and probably increasing Soviet usage of Syrian usage of Syrian naval and air facilities.

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2. Iran-Iraq: Principal agency representatives reviewed the Iran-Iraq situation, and concluded that no new elements in this equation have


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been observed. The degree of likelihood of a major conventional Iranian attack into Iraq had not changed, and the community feels other options are open to the Iranians (i.e. subversion, continued border warfare) which they will utilize prior to taking a decision to attack.



Charles E. Waterman

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